根据以前的发现,windowsNT密码虽然不象Windows95那样以简单加密形式包含在一个文件里面,而是一些杂乱的暗码,分别藏在7个不同的地方。这篇最新发表的文章告诉我们WindowsNT密码隐藏的第八个地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100& C9 ^3 e9 U* T, h
9 }/ f7 H/ _/ |" a1 s3 @From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
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To: sans@clark.net
/ t* v1 A' e! L+ C) ?& ]" E6 NSubject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
P$ z d K" [9 Y' S1 `5 O. ]Hi all,' H2 U( L2 e5 y q$ R) s
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
9 Q- o/ J- n) b" p: S+ e2 _( dthe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
: T* G+ t q; qIIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
6 ]2 G3 I( x* }" l# e7 R5 W: ^. Rbe compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,0 z! `8 S8 x6 V% o( ?
Keys and Values. It is stored in the following file:( s3 U4 {" K$ B1 ~# Y
C:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin8 f2 J/ S2 ]" I
The IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
. v6 z$ V6 @" o- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
# w$ S! B" \- o+ T: N/ F: m2 z+ C0 iMMC)
\7 H' G4 n: ]- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)4 I/ T `! @# K) a8 x
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
7 W7 }1 o, j q0 f+ Q, Jyour virtual directories is located there.- S/ C% s* a& d8 B4 j
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
* o; B# Q& X6 ?9 E; \* ^, R"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).9 o* w: r" H+ z
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are ]& b% r3 s6 e8 e
srambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM" U) Z7 a t: {/ Y5 Q8 L
have permissions on this file.
# F4 j! \ N; E7 x ]) LBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
$ }5 i, e9 o9 u, ~these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
, k( {6 D0 w, j$ ~" q$ }( S, OThe user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a) d; O: t6 b" p4 y
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.- t: ^! m0 a, n* h3 I0 y
Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow8 S0 C3 y3 J' v* Q
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
$ M3 R7 y% Q$ _+ A& R; S4 H6 Gproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
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, I, U% J. y5 E3 _3 L# MIIS 4.0 Metabase
- K' H7 U" _& d7 I% L/ Z?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr y2 u& \, L0 R4 J/ [( K% r7 X$ |0 D
--- UNC User ---+ A3 g1 o4 L$ P2 g% G; s& @
UNC User name: 'Lou'2 X3 J( P" n2 f6 _6 i+ x
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
* q1 `- m2 [' l$ J! F8 l5 BUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'# @$ C- @. x% v) h: _; e( b5 m* a* ~
--- Anonymous User ---* j' |1 u; j, g: ^/ ^/ a; O8 G
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
. z7 } X. m: HAnonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
% t1 P# E+ ?( MPassword synchronization: 'False'
( B6 x" ~; {& h--- IIS Logs DSN User ---: c; p: l% I! S4 G" U
ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
7 N, J& @' S0 d9 ?( yODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
9 M5 T, B6 p+ H. ]6 D8 \! K) k* wODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'7 x. p. ~ c2 U* ^. ^7 ?
ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
$ R* \9 }: E% H6 b+ G: H--- Web Applications User ---& y7 _/ x2 r( o, N( L8 i6 }
WAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'' J3 F4 w n7 V) W
WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'5 z, b+ G% S9 \2 i% \
Default Logon Domain: ''
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For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
% e+ G# y- M, l8 |+ b1 \4 }A user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
( ?. j+ I) c0 N; d8 Yserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example! S& @/ N& [' i" W* d9 ]% Z1 K
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts4 V8 N3 E% E4 B3 D
the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
7 R6 P8 C, b- J1 {: c* ^directory located on another server, say (b).( o, }0 w1 o- x+ `' C( y
Now, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
; s$ ?7 I2 S4 p5 X o* M) i S8 G0 EAnd so forth...
. b5 G# C* H( y* H Y. E% fMicrosoft was informed of this vulnerability.
$ }8 i$ y2 v' [. L$ x( j2 s% {( }_______________________________________________________________________ p% U8 k* e4 l" n3 }# _+ u
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
: @2 |8 e P/ nMCP NT 4.0+ }6 r' k. [+ |- y3 h
Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions
& ]" W5 S( x% ]& }, g/ Z% U) R; Ge-business Services: y0 L% Q: {4 _& o6 x
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